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Rail Safety and Standards BoardThe paper addresses the validation of opinion measurement by survey, speciﬁcally how the
‘‘readings’’ or views are consolidated for policy use into a single ﬁgure held to be represen-
tative of the population as a whole. While the sample mean might seem the obvious choice,
a number of inﬂuential safety studies have employed a more complicated metric, the Val-
uation Index, as discussed within, to assess whether more should be spent to protect
against some hazards than others. The question arises as to whether the Valuation Index
treats the views of the different people in the survey sample impartially or not.
The Valuation Index possesses the property of reciprocality, in the sense that the Index of
the reciprocal is equal to the reciprocal of the Index. Jensen’s inequality reveals that this
reciprocality comes at the price of an inconsistent treatment of the individual’s view when-
ever there is any difference of opinion in the sample. The Valuation Index is found to be
non-unique, in that a Second Valuation Index can be constructed using equivalent argu-
ments. Thus if the Valuation Index is valid, then so must be the Second Valuation Index,
but the latter returns a different value, implying a contradiction that can be resolved only
by regarding neither as valid.
Crucially, both the Valuation Index and the Second Valuation Index fail the test of struc-
tural view independence. Both indices are biased and thus neither is a valid measure for
consolidating human opinions.
The ﬁnding has particular importance for the UK because opinion surveys interpreted
using the Valuation Index have been inﬂuential in the changes to safety policy brought
in for UK rail transport, where the amount recommended to avert death in multiple fatality
accidents since 2003 has been reduced to about a third of what it used to be.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Measurement of economic parameters has enormous
importance for the way in which we live our lives, partic-
ularly when they are used by governments and others to
set policy. The onus on the person or persons carrying
out such measurements to ensure the fairness of the mea-
surement is correspondingly great. The burden of this duty
will not be especially irksome when the measurement is ofvalue in a free market, where the measurement task
reduces simply to ﬁnding the price on which buyer and
seller agree. However, there are and always will be
instances where no obvious market exists, particularly in
the case of public goods such as clean air or, the continued
survival of a rare species of plant or animal, where it is still
desirable to know what value people place on the amenity
so that a cost-beneﬁt analysis may be carried out.
‘‘Revealed preferences’’ may enable an inferential mea-
surement of the value of the non-market good to be made.
Such methods conform to John Locke’s precept: ‘‘I have
always thought the actions of men the best interpreters
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through observing what quantiﬁable beneﬁt has been
given up in order to secure a certain quantity of that good
or a proxy, or else, if the good is undesirable, what quanti-
ﬁable burden has been taken on to avoid it. Clearly, the
revealed preference technique requires a model of the sys-
tem, and, as a minimum, that model needs to be transpar-
ent so that it can be examined in full detail by a person
possessed of the necessary mathematical skills.
Attempts may be made to measure the value of a
non-market good using opinion polling or market-survey
techniques. These ‘‘stated preference’’ methods are some-
times referred to as ‘‘contingent valuation’’ [11] since the
estimates obtained are conditional or ’’contingent’’ on the
features of the scenario presented to the respondents
taking part in the survey [8]. The surveyor needs to ensure
as far as possible that each opinion elicited is both true, in
the sense that it represents the view of the respondent
and not, for example, what he thinks he ought to say, and
stable, in the sense that it will represent the respondent’s
feelings on the subject for a reasonable amount of time into
the future. Once the views of the respondents have been
gathered, their interpretation becomes a key issue, since
opinion polls and market surveys are based on the notion
that an opinion that is in some sense characteristic of an
entire population can be measured fairly accurately from
the statements made by people in a random sample drawn
from that population.
Deriving from the success of measurement in the phys-
ical sciences, a sound philosophical and theoretical basis
has been developed for the general process of measure-
ment [14]. But as noted by Boumans [6], economic systems
may be characterised formally as ‘‘soft’’, since they satisfy
two out of the three Finkelstein criteria for being regarded
as such: (i) they involve human action, perception, feeling,
decisions and the like and (ii) they usually have signiﬁcant
size and complexity, making experimental determination
of relations between system elements impractical in many
cases. It can be anticipated, therefore, that the soft mea-
surement task of measuring the value of a non-market
good may bring difﬁculties that are generally greater than
those associated with many physical measurements.
Finkelstein [15] states that ‘‘measurement owes its
power, primarily, to the objectivity of its description’’. Lack
of objectivity may arise from the features of the model nec-
essary to interpret the raw measurement data and provide
information on the property actually of interest, of which
the measurand is normally only a manifestation. Indeed
Finkelstein [15] observes that the observer/analyst in
social sciences has been argued not to be objective, but
to operate ‘‘on the basis of ideologically motivated theo-
ries’’. In a similar vein, measurement theorists Mari et al.
[20] regard objectivity and inter-subjective testability as
the critical features for the reliability and dependability
of measurement. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mari
and Ugazio [21] should see the validation of soft measure-
ments as a topic of increasing importance, and hold that
‘‘the meaningfulness . . . of the obtained results depends
on interpretive models, that become pivotal for the valida-
tion of measurements and results’’. Indeed, given the clear
potential for subjectivity and the widely held suspicionsthereof, it is clearly important to open up the soft measure-
ment process to examination and test, including the inter-
pretation and processing of measurement data.
The personal valuations given in an opinion survey
constitute the readings in what is an exercise in soft mea-
surement. The subsequent processing of these readings
makes up a crucial component of the measurement task,
analogous to the ﬁltering of the signal in a physical mea-
surement system, for example by Kalman ﬁltering. This
paper addresses the process by which the views measured
in an opinion survey are ﬁltered to give one consolidated
view that is then considered representative of the popula-
tion as a whole. In particular, the paper will investigate
the statistic employed in the consolidation of views in a
number of inﬂuential surveys used in the UK to set expendi-
ture priorities on systems to protect against fatal accidents.
It has been shown [26] that when the consolidation
method to be applied to human views can be represented
as a sequential process of transformation, averaging and
back-transformation, of all the possible increasing and dif-
ferentiable transformations, only linear functions preserve
the necessary impartiality. This implies that the arithmetic
or sample mean is valid as an unbiased measure of human
opinion, but that, for example, both the geometric mean
and the root mean square are invalid.
However, a different statistic has been used in prefer-
ence to the sample mean in a number of inﬂuential studies
carried out in the UK to assess the amount of money that
should be spent to avert death from accidents. These stud-
ies include that commissioned in 1998 jointly by the UK
Health and Safety Executive, the UK Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, the UK Home
Ofﬁce and the UK Treasury [3,4], the 2000 study commis-
sioned by the UK Health and Safety Executive [7] (both
reported in [10]) and the 2008 study by the UK Rail Safety
and Standards Board [12], further reported in Covey et al.
[13]. This statistic was called ‘‘relativity’’ in Chilton et al.
[10], ‘‘sample valuation ratio’’ in Covey et al. [12] and ‘‘val-
uation ratio’’ in Covey et al. [13]. For clarity and ease of dis-
cussion the statistic will be given a single name in this
paper, the ‘‘Valuation Index’’.
The Valuation Index was used in the Chilton article (op.
cit.) to conclude that:
‘‘while people’s priorities are indeed sensitive to the
combined inﬂuence of the number of deaths, the psy-
chological characteristics of hazards and social ampliﬁ-
cation effects following a major accident, in practice (at
least using our particular elicitation methodology) it is
the number of deaths which would appear to dominate
the quantitative judgements people give. That is, it
would seem that maximising the number of deaths pre-
vented is of primary importance to many people.’’
Indeed, the House of Lords Select Committee on
Economic Affairs [16] made speciﬁc reference to Chilton
et al. [10] in its Fifth Report, and noted that.
‘‘since 2003 the rail industry and the Rail Safety and
Standards Board (RSSB) in particular have now aban-
doned the use of the two distinct VPFs [values of a
prevented fatality] and have instead elected to apply a
Table 1
Number of deaths in scenarios A and B, NAk and NBk,
deemed to be equivalently bad.
Respondent number Scenario A Scenario B
1 NA1 NB1
2 NA2 NB2
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Transport roads ﬁgure. For example, in its recent docu-
ment, Valuing Safety, the RSSB notes that:
‘The term ‘gross disproportion’ was used by some peo-
ple in the past to describe the concept of using a higher
VPF for multi-fatality accidents. We can see no justiﬁca-
tion, either in the Edwards judgement or in the balanc-
ing approach of risk against sacriﬁce, for this
interpretation’.’’
The effect of RSSB’s decision in 2003 to abandon the use
of two different VPFs, one for single fatality accidents and a
larger one for multi-fatality accidents, had the practical
effect of reducing by a factor of about three the amount
that rail operators were obliged to spend to avert an acci-
dent likely to result in multiple fatalities, as explained by
Bearﬁeld [5]:
‘‘Following a catastrophic train accident at Clapham
Junction in 1988 a disproportion factor of 2.8 between
costs and risks was adopted by the British Railways
Board (BRB) for risk associated with multi-fatality train
accidents. These accidents are associated with high lev-
els of ‘societal concern’. This ﬁgure was derived from
research studies BRB had commissioned. Up until
2003/2004 stakeholders within the railway industry
applied an approach that was consistent with this
thinking using a multiplier of three. For other types of
risk no multiplier was applied. After this time, on the
advice of the Department for Transport, the industry
stopped using this multiplier.’’
Jack [17] gave the clariﬁcation that the Ofﬁce of Rail
Regulation no longer required the duty holders in the UK
railway industry to consider any potential socio-political
response to a multi-fatality incident, which was taken to
be a matter for Government and the regulators.
Given the apparent inﬂuence of studies using the Valu-
ation Index on the views of the UK Government, the UK’s
Rail Safety and Standards Board and the UK rail regulator,
and the resulting reduced requirement for safety spending
on the part of the UK rail industry, it is clearly desirable to
understand the properties of the Valuation Index fully, and
to ﬁnd out if it treats the views of the different people con-
sulted in the survey impartially or not.
To these ends, a general mathematical formulation will
be made of the Valuation Index, and its properties will be
brought out. Its value relative to the sample mean will be
examined, and it will be tested for impartiality using the
concept of structural view independence [26]. The statis-
tic’s property of reciprocality, considered desirable by its
proponents, will then be examined in the light of Jensen’s
inequality, and the consequential side-effects brought
out. A discussion of the statistic’s overall properties will
then be given, following which conclusions will be drawn...
. ..
. ..
.
j NAj NBj
..
. ..
. ..
.
k NAk NBk
..
. ..
. ..
.
n NAn NBn2. Mathematical description of scenario-dependent
death matching
The method given in Chilton et al. [10] may be
described and modelled as follows. It is desired to investi-gate the views of respondent k to two sets of circumstances
and manners of dying, generalised as scenario A and sce-
nario B. Imagine that individual k would be prepared to
authorise a sum of money, VAk, to avert one death in the
base scenario A and a possibly different sum of money,
VBk, to avert one death in an alternative scenario B that is
under investigation. Now suppose that data are available
on a pairwise comparison between options A and B as
given in Table 1, where respondent k deems the number
of deaths,NAk, in scenario A to represent as undesirable
an outcome as NBk deaths in scenario B. Since the individ-
ual regards the two outcomes as equally bad, it is reason-
able to assume that he would be prepared to authorise
equal expenditure to avert these deaths. Hence
NAkVAk ¼ NBkVBk ð1Þ
The ratio, RBAk, of the second amount, VBk, to the ﬁrst, VAk, is
then the ‘‘valuation ratio’’, given by:
RBAk ¼ VBkVAk ¼
NAk
NBk
k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ð2Þ
so that the valuation ratio is calculated relative to base sce-
nario A. It may be seen that there has been no need to
assign a ﬁgure to the ‘‘Value of a Prevented Fatality’’
(VPF) for any of the respondents. (In reality, we never pre-
vent a fatality, but simply restore life expectancy to its
value prior to exposure to the risk in question. Thus the
acronym, VPF, ought really to be written VTPF, the value
of a temporarily prevented fatality. See, for example,
[23,25,24,22,27,28].)
It is now possible to estimate without bias the expected
valuation ratio, E(RBA), for the population as a whole from
the sample mean:
EðRBAÞ  RBA ¼ 1n
Xn
k¼1
RBAk ð3Þ
where RBA is the sample mean. Wemay note in passing that
the weighting given to each person’s valuation ratio is the
same: the weighting factor is 1/n in each case. Moreover,
an unbiased estimate for the variance of the population,
var(RBA), is then found easily from the sample data by:
varðRBAÞ  1n 1
Xn
k¼1
RBAk  RBA
 2 ð4Þ
However Chilton et al. [10] suggested that the approach
embodied in Eqs. (3) and (4) above of ﬁnding ‘‘the
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ously recommended by Jones-Lee and Loomes [19], was
now ‘‘superseded’’. They recommended instead a new
technique for analysing paired data of the form shown in
Table 1, resulting in a new statistic, the Valuation Index.
Implicit in the Valuation Index is the assignment of a
monetary value to the VPF, and in the ﬁrst instance we
may suppose that each respondent sets his own valuation,
VPFk, in whatever currency he wishes. VPFk is the base unit
or numéraire for respondent k. Two convenient possibilities
present themselves at this point. In Convention 1, respon-
dent, k, takes the amount he would authorise to avert
death under the scenario he fears more as his reference
point, and wants less spent on averting death in the
scenario he fears less. In this case 1 VPFk is the maximum
that respondent k is prepared to have spent to prevent
one fatality under either scenario. In Convention 2, it is
supposed that respondent, k, takes as his reference point
the amount he would sanction to avert death under the sce-
nario he fears less, and wants more to be spent on averting
death in the scenario he fears more. Now 1 VPFk will be the
minimum that respondent k is prepared to authorise to pre-
vent one fatality under either scenario. The UK rail industry
was effectively using Convention 2 between 1988 and 2003,
when it had a baseline VPF, which it would increase by a
factor of 2.8 to give a special VPF for multi-fatality acci-
dents. By contrast, Chilton et al. [10] adopted Convention
1 as the basis for their Valuation Index.
To develop the mathematical model under Convention
1, let us ﬁrst assume that death in scenario A is feared by
respondent k as much or more than death in scenario B.
Put simply, scenario A is more frightening to respondent
k than scenario B, or at least as frightening. In such a case,
he will make the number of scenario A deaths smaller than
or equal to the number of deaths in scenario B, NAk 6 NBk,
so that, by Eq. (2), his valuation ratio will be less than or
equal to unity:
RBAk 6 1 ð5Þ
Each of those NAk more fearsome deaths will be valued
at 1 VPFk, so that
VAk ¼ 1 for RBAk 6 1 ð6Þ
while the VPF in scenario B will be given by applying Eq.
(2):
VBk ¼ RBAkVAk ¼ RBAk for RBAk 6 1 ð7Þ
where Eq. (6) has been used in the second step.
Now let us consider the alternative possibility that
death in scenario A is feared less than death in scenario B
by respondent k. In such a case, he will make the number
of scenario A deaths greater than the number of deaths
in scenario B, NAk > NBk, so that, by Eq. (2) the valuation
ratio will be greater than unity:
RBAk > 1 ð8Þ
By Convention 1, each of those NBk deaths in scenario B
will be valued at 1 VPFk, so that now
VBk ¼ 1 for RBAk > 1 ð9Þ
while, using Eq. (9):VAk ¼ VBkRBAk ¼ R
1
BAk for RBAk > 1 ð10Þ
where the second step has made use of Eq. (9).
Eqs. (6) and (10) may be combined to give the more
compact description:
VAk ¼ min 1;R1BAk
 
ð11Þ
while Eqs. (7) and (9) may be combined into
VBk ¼ minð1;RBAkÞ ð12Þ
If Convention 2 is adopted, on the other hand, then it
can be shown by an analogous procedure that the VPF val-
ues for scenarios A and B for respondent k are the different
values:
VAk ¼ max 1;R1BAk
 
ð13Þ
VBk ¼ maxð1;RBAkÞ ð14Þ
It is important to realise that, while the VPFs under sce-
narios A and B, VAk and VBk respectively, are convention-
dependent, the valuation ratios, RBAk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n, are
not (since RBAk depends directly on survey data: RBAk = NAk/
NBk).
Thus, the valuation ratio for respondent kmay be recov-
ered from Eqs. (11) and (12), valid under Convention 1, by:
RBAk ¼ VBkVAk ¼
minð1;RBAkÞ
min 1;R1BAk
  ¼ RBAk1 ¼ RBAk for RBAk 6 11
R1BAk
¼ RBAk for RBAk > 1
(
ð15Þ
Similarly the valuation ratio for respondent k may be
recovered once again from the VPFs pertaining under Con-
vention 2, Eqs. (13) and (14) by:
RBAk ¼ VBkVAk ¼
maxð1;RBAkÞ
max 1;R1BAk
  ¼ 1R1BAk ¼ RBAk for RBAk 6 1
RBAk
1 ¼ RBAk for RBAk > 1
8<
:
ð16Þ
The fact that the valuation ratio, RBAk, for respondent k
can be recovered in both cases (Eqs. (15) and (16)) gives
a further demonstration that it does not matter which Con-
vention respondent k adopts in order to assign monetary
value: both are equally valid as a valuation convention.
Moreover, respondent j may adopt Convention 1 and
respondent k may adopt Convention 2 and it will still be
possible to calculate the valuation ratios, RBAj and RBAk.
Thus the sample mean, which depends linearly on RBAk,
k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and only on those values, will be unaffected
by different choices of valuation convention amongst the
respondents.
3. The properties of the Valuation Index, I()
Let us now consider the Valuation Index, I(RBA), which is
found as the ratio of means:
IðRBAÞ ¼ VB
VA
¼
Pn
k¼1VBkPn
k¼1VAk
ð17Þ
where
00.005
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Fig. 1. Weighting of view, pk, versus the number of deaths in scenario A
judged to be as bad as 10 deaths in scenario B, example of Section 3.
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Xn
k¼1
VAk ð18Þ
while
VB ¼ 1n
Xn
k¼1
VBk ð19Þ
The possibility for different respondents to choose a dif-
ferent valuation convention now disappears, as Chilton
et al. [10] assume that Convention 1 will be adopted by
all respondents:
‘‘Clearly, on the usual interpretation of individual
matching responses, these ratios give each person’s
value for the prevention of a fatality in any particular
context relative to his/her value for the prevention of
a fatality in his/her higher-ranked context.’’
A ratio of means will satisfy the requirement for recip-
rocality, in the sense that the index of the reciprocal is
equal to the reciprocal of the index, as desired by the
authors of the Valuation Index as their ‘‘Condition 1’’ and
as shown below:
I
1
RBA
 
¼ IðRABÞ ¼ VA
VB
¼ VB
VA
 !1
¼ 1
IðRBAÞ ð20Þ
The structure of the Valuation Index will now be exam-
ined further. Adopting Convention 1 and thus using Eqs.
(11) and (12) in Eq. (17) gives:
IðRBAÞ ¼
Pn
k¼1 minð1;RBAkÞPn
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
  ð21Þ
But
minð1;RBAkÞ ¼ RBAk min 1RBAk ;1
 
¼ min 1;R1BAk
 
RBAk ð22Þ
Hence Eq. (21) may be re-expressed as:
IðRBAÞ ¼
Xn
k¼1
pkRBAk ð23Þ
where pk is the weight put on individual k’s opinion:
pk ¼
min 1;R1BAk
 
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  ð24Þ
If all the respondents fear scenario B less than scenario
A or fear the two scenarios equally, then VAkP VBk and so,
from Eq. (2), each respondent will have a valuation ratio
less than or equal to unity:
RBAk 6 1 for all k ð25Þ
In this restricted case, when nobody ﬁnds death in sce-
nario B more fearsome, the weighting on each person’s
view is the same:
pk ¼ 1n for all k ð26Þ
in which case Eq. (21) returns the sample mean:IðRBAÞ ¼ 1n
Xn
m¼1
RBAm ¼ RBA ð27Þ
But the situation becomes rather different when anyone
in the sample fears scenario B more than scenario A.
Expanding Eq. (24) for the exclusive and exhaustive cases
that the valuation ratio is either less than or equal to unity
or greater than unity, RBAk 6 1 and RBAk > 1, the weighting
applied to the opinion of respondent k is:
pk ¼
1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAmð Þ for RBAk 6 1
1
RBAk
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAmð Þ for RBAk > 1
8<
: ð28Þ
It is clear from Eq. (28) that the views of all respondents
who fear death under scenario B less than under scenario A
and hence consider that RBAk 6 1 will be given a high and
equal weighting. Meanwhile those respondents who fear
death in scenario B more than death under scenario A,
who will have a valuation ratio, RBAk > 1, will ﬁnd their
views given a lower weighting. The presence of the valua-
tion ratio, RBAk, in the denominator when RBAk > 1 in Eq.
(28), second line, means that the more that a respondent
fears death in scenario B, the more his view will be
downgraded.
A simple numerical example illustrates the point.
Assume 40 people have given their opinions of how much
to spend on preventing scenario B and how much on pre-
venting scenario A in terms of the number of deaths under
each scenario that they would consider equivalent. For
simplicity, the number of deaths under scenario B has been
assumed kept constant at 10 for all respondents, so that
they will have varied the equivalent number of deaths
under scenario A. Suppose respondent 1 considered 1
death under scenario A to be equivalent to 10 deaths under
scenario B, respondent 2 considered 2 deaths under sce-
nario A to be equivalent, and so on, until respondent 40
considered 40 deaths under scenario A to be equivalent
to 10 deaths under scenario B.
Fig. 1 shows the weighting, pk, given to the view of
respondent k against the number of deaths in scenario A
he judged to be equivalent to 10 deaths under scenario B.
It is clear that the Valuation Index is biased systematically
160 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173against the views of those who fear death in scenario B
more than death in scenario A.4. The low value of the Valuation Index relative to the
sample mean
The Valuation Index in the example just given was
found to be 1.51, less than the sample mean, which was
2.05. In fact, the Valuation Index can be demonstrated to
be less than or equal to the sample mean on all occasions.
Appendix A compares the ﬁgures returned by the
Valuation Index and by the sample mean. It shows that
the Valuation Index is equal to the sample mean in two
circumstances only, both of which place severe constraints
on the possible views of the individual:
(i) when all views are identical – the case of a degener-
ate probability distribution likely to occur only
when a required response is dictated to the respon-
dents, and
(ii) when no valuation ratio, RBAk, is more than unity,
implying that there is not even one respondent
who fears scenario B more than scenario A.
In all other cases the Valuation Index will be less than
the sample mean. Thus if there is a spread of opinions,
where some people fear scenario A more than scenario B
while others have a greater fear of scenario B, the Valua-
tion Index of B relative to A must be less than the sample
mean. In fact, it is necessary for only one respondent to fear
scenario B more than scenario A for the Valuation Index,
I(RBA), to fall below the sample mean.5. Using structural view independence to test the
Valuation Index for impartiality
At this point it is appropriate to introduce the concept
of structural view independence, a new and recently pub-
lished criterion [26] for judging if the consolidation of
human valuations into a single ﬁgure is objective. That
paper found the sample mean to be the ‘‘gold standard’’
against which other means, such as the geometric mean
or root-mean-square, should be judged. Central measures
other than the sample mean can open the analyst to the
charge of bias, but the sample mean protects the analyst
from any suspicion of bias.
Deﬁning a view as a person’s judgement of the value
of a continuous numerical parameter, a consolidated
statistic is structurally view dependent when the pro-
cess of consolidation involves using one or more of
the views in the sample to ﬁlter an individual’s view
[26]. The Valuation Index, I(RBA), will be shown to fail
the test for structural view independence that is neces-
sary for impartiality.
Consider the sensitivity of the Valuation Index to the
views of individual respondents. The relevant sensitivity
functions, @ I/@RBAk, are derived in Appendix B as equations
(B.10) and (B.15). The form of the sensitivity function
depends on whether or not the kth valuation ratio, RBAk,
is above or below unity:@I
@RBAk
¼ 1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  RBAk 6 1 ð29Þ
@I
@RBAk
¼
Pn
m¼1RBAm min 1;R
1
BAm
 
R2BAk
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  2 RBAk > 1 ð30Þ
It is clear from Eqs. (29) and (30) that the sensitivity func-
tion will depend on all the valuation ratios, RBAk, k = 1,
2, . . . , n, with the exception of the case where RBAk 6 1 for
all k. In this case Eq. (29) is applicable, and reduces to
@I
@RBAk
¼ 1
n
when RBAk 6 1 for all k ð31Þ
Eq. (31) is, of course, consistent with Eq. (26), and leads
to the sample mean of Eq. (27).
Eq. (30) demonstrates that the sensitivity will decrease
as the inverse square of the valuation ratio when the valu-
ation ratio is greater than unity, RBAi > 1. Thus the Valua-
tion Index is structurally view dependent, giving a high
weight to the views of certain individuals in the sample
while according others a lower inﬂuence, based purely on
the size of their views. In fact, it exhibits a systematic bias
towards low values.
The effect of this systematic bias will be illustrated by a
numerical example, where the development of the Valua-
tion Index is traced over time. Suppose that an organisa-
tion is spending the same amount of money to avert a
death in scenario B as in scenario A but wants to know
whether the public wants more money spent against B. It
decides to consult an analyst, who uses a focus group to
provide data that he interprets using the Valuation Index.
To keep the arithmetic clear, and for the purposes of
illustration, it will be assumed that the focus group con-
sists of just 7 people, who spend a working day considering
the question of how many deaths in scenarios A and B each
of them regards as equally bad. Their Table 1 is assumed to
evolve, as will their valuation ratios, rBAk, k = 1, 2 . . . , 7, of
desirable spending to avert a death under scenario B com-
pared with the sum they would like to see spent to avert a
death under scenario A. (The opinions of the members of
the focus group are here regarded as realised values.)
It is assumed that each person starts the day with the
view that death is equally to be feared in either scenario,
so that rBAk = 1.0 for all k. However, their views start to
diverge as their judgements mature over the day. Persons
1–7 move towards ﬁnal valuations, rBAkf, of 3.0, 2.5, 2.0,
0.75, 0.65, 0.55 and 0.4, where the additional subscript, f,
indicates ‘‘ﬁnal’’. For simplicity and the purposes of dis-
play, the evolution of each of these views is assumed to
take the form of an exponential lag with a time constant
of 80 min, so that they have reached a steady state by
the end of the day, six time constants or 8 h later. Appendix
E outlines the mathematical model for how the respon-
dent’s views and hence the Valuation Index, I, change in
the focus group during the day.
Fig. 2 shows the evolution over the day of the views of
the seven people, and, in addition, the sample mean, rBA
and the Valuation Index, I(rBA). Fig. 3 shows how the sensi-
tivity functions, @I/@RBAk, alter over time as the views
change, while Table 2 summarises the starting and ending
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Fig. 2. Evolution of views in the numerical example of Section 5, value
ratios for death in scenario B with death in scenario A as base.
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity functions for the 7 people in the numerical example of
Section 5 when the Valuation Index is for death in scenario B with death
in scenario A as base, I(RBA).
P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173 161values for: the views of the seven people, the sensitivity
functions, the sample mean and the Valuation Index.
The Valuation Index in the steady state is I(rBA) = 1.022,
signiﬁcantly less than the sample mean, rBA ¼ 1:407. Thus
while the sample mean would suggest that spending on
averting each death under scenario B should be increased
by 40%, the Valuation Index suggests that people are essen-
tially indifferent, and that no further expenditure is neces-
sary. Thus the organisation will save itself money if it takes
advice based on the Valuation Index.
The fact that the Valuation Index always lies below the
sample mean may be explained by reference to thesensitivity functions shown in Fig. 3. The sensitivity of
the Valuation Index to each view is seen to depend
strongly on the size of the various views. So while all sen-
sitivities are the same at the beginning when everyone
holds the same view, their magnitudes diverge as people’s
views evolve. The 4 views placing rBA 6 1 are always given
the greatest inﬂuence: the sensitivities for Persons 4, 5, 6
and 7 are equal highest at all times, steadying out at
0.191. By contrast, those views placing rBAk > 1 attract rel-
atively little inﬂuence, and Person 1, who fears scenario B
most, has his view downgraded most: the sensitivity is just
0.022 at the end of the day, down by an order of magnitude
on the inﬂuence accorded those whose valuation ratios
were less than or equal to unity.
But the numbers contained in the equivalent of Table 1
may be used to investigate not only whether the public
wants more spent on averting a death in scenario B than
in base scenario A, but also whether the public wants more
spent on averting death in scenario A than in scenario B,
since rABk ¼ r1BAk ¼ nBk=nAk. Scenario B becomes now the
base scenario. Fig. 4 shows the evolution of the valuation
ratios, rABk, k = 1, 2, . . . , 7, as well as the Valuation Index
and the sample mean. Table 3 shows the starting and end-
ing values of the views of the seven people, the sensitivity
functions, the sample mean and the Valuation Index when
scenario B is the base scenario. Once again the ﬁnal value
of Valuation Index is signiﬁcantly less at I(rAB) = 0.978 than
the ﬁnal value of the sample mean, rAB ¼ 1:203. Thus while
the sample mean would suggest that spending to avert a
death under scenario A should be higher, the Valuation
Index suggests that people are essentially indifferent, and
that no further expenditure is necessary. Once again, if
the organisation takes advice based on the Valuation Index,
it will save itself money. But the Valuation Index has
allowed this apparent economy only by discriminating
strongly against the opinions of some people in the survey.
Fig. 5 shows the close-of-day sensitivity functions for
each respondent, both @I/@RBAk, when scenario A is the base
scenario and @I/@RABk, when scenario B is the base scenario.
The two sensitivities for the same person are different by
up to an order of magnitude at the same time. Thus at
the end of the day, Person 1 has a sensitivity of 0.187 when
I(rAB) is being calculated, but, simultaneously, a sensitivity
of 0.022 when I(rBA) is being calculated. Corresponding
simultaneous ﬁgures for Person 7 are 0.029 and 0.191.
These biases and contradictions emerge as the price
paid for the reciprocality displayed by the Valuation Index.
To suggest that, because society might more spent to avert
death in scenario A it automatically must want less spent
to avert death in scenario B, as indicated by the Valuation
Index, is to ascribe a certainty of view to society that is not
possessed in a democracy. Reciprocality of view is not to be
expected in an open society, where views are not imposed.
And if views were to be imposed, what would be the point
of an opinion survey?
So how do we account for the fact that the sample
means are not reciprocal, not even close in this case, with
rBA ¼ 1:407 and rAB ¼ 1:203 in the steady state? Is it not
contradictory that the same focus group is urging 40%
more to be spent on averting a death in scenario B than
in scenario A, while at the same time, asking that 20% more
Table 2
Scenario A is the base scenario. Start and end of the day: valuation ratios and sensitivity functions at the for the 7 respondents in the focus group, sample mean,
rBA , and Valuation Index, I(rBA).
Respondent number, k Start of day End of day
Valuation ratio, rBAk,
for respondent, k
Sensitivity function
@I
@RBAk
Valuation ratio, rBAk,
for respondent, k
Sensitivity function
@I
@RBAk
1 1 0.1429 3.00 0.0218
2 1 0.1429 2.50 0.0313
3 1 0.1429 2.00 0.0490
4 1 0.1429 0.75 0.1910
5 1 0.1429 0.65 0.1910
6 1 0.1429 0.55 0.1910
7 1 0.1429 0.40 0.1910
Sample mean, rBA 1 – 1.41 –
Valuation Index, I(rBA) 1 – 1.02 –
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Fig. 4. Evolution of views in the numerical example of Section 5, value
ratios for death in scenario A with death in scenario B as base, I(RAB).
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162 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173be spent to prevent a death in scenario A than in scenario
B? In fact, what is being signalled is the strong divergence
of opinion in the focus group. If such a wide split occurredTable 3
Scenario B is the base scenario. Start and end of the day: valuation ratios and sensit
rAB , and Valuation Index, I(rAB).
Respondent number, k Start of day
Valuation ratio, rBAk,
for respondent, k
Sensitivity functio
1 1 0.1429
2 1 0.1429
3 1 0.1429
4 1 0.1429
5 1 0.1429
6 1 0.1429
7 1 0.1429
Sample mean, rAB 1 –
Valuation Index, I(rAB) 1 –in practice, surely it is this that should be explored ﬁrst as a
source of valuable information.
For example, is there a commonality, in the sense that
each person wants the current spend against death in the
less fearsome scenario to be maintained but extra to beivity functions at the for the 7 respondents in the focus group, sample mean,
End of day
n
@I
@RABk
Valuation ratio, rBAk,
for respondent, k
Sensitivity function
@I
@RABk
0.33 0.1868
0.40 0.1868
0.50 0.1868
1.33 0.1030
1.54 0.0774
1.82 0.0554
2.50 0.0293
1.20 –
0.98 –
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the probability distributions, pk for I(RBA) and qk for
I(RAB).
P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173 163spent to prevent death in his more frightening scenario?
Does this mean that the amounts that members of the
focus group think are being spent at present to avert a
death in both scenarios are too low? If the expenditure
on preventing a death in both scenarios were raised, would
the disparity between opinions reduce? Do new arguments
need to be presented if the opinions of both factions in the
group are to be drawn closer?
These are open questions. It may be remarked that it is
exceedingly difﬁcult to please all people on an issue of
importance to them, a proposition that will come as no sur-
prise to politicians in a democracy. The non-reciprocality of
the sample mean, the arithmetic average of the valuation
ratios, would appear to reﬂect common democratic experi-
ence here.
6. The reciprocality of the Valuation Index
It is shown in Appendix A that the Valuation Index,
I(RBA), may be regarded as the expectation of the valuation
ratio, RBA, under the condition that the probability of
selecting the view of individual is pk:
IðRBAÞ ¼ E
pk
sðRBAÞ ð32Þ
Here the expectation operator, E, has been given the
superscript, s, to signify that the population of interest in
this case is the sample population and also marked with
the discrete probability distribution, pk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n. By
Jensen’s inequality [18,9]
E
pk
s 1
RBA
 
>
1
E
pk
sðRBAÞ ð33Þ
so that, using Eq. (32),
E
pk
s 1
RBA
 
>
1
IðRBAÞ ð34Þ
Comparing inequality (34) with Eq. (20) demonstrates
that
I
1
RBA
 
¼ 1
IðRBAÞ < Epk
s 1
RBA
 
ð35Þ
The question arises as to the value of I(1/RBA). Noting
that RABk = VAk/VBk = 1/RBAk, inverting the valuation ratio
transforms Eq. (17) into
I
1
RBA
 
¼
Pn
k¼1VAkPn
k¼1VBk
ð36Þ
Substituting for VAk and VBk from Eqs. (11) and (12) into
Eq. (36) gives
I
1
RBA
 
¼
Pn
m¼1 minð1;RABmÞPn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
ABm
  ð37Þ
which may be expanded to yield:
I
1
RBA
 
¼
Xn
m¼1
min 1;R1ABm
 
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
ABm
 RABm ¼Xn
m¼1
qmRABm
¼
Xn
m¼1
qm
1
RBAm
ð38Þwhere qk is the probability distribution:
qk ¼
min 1;R1ABk
 
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
ABm
  ð39Þ
It is clear that the probability distribution given in Eq.
(39) must be different from the probability distribution
given by Eq. (24), so that
qk – pk ð40Þ
As an example, Fig. 6 shows the differing probability
distributions for the data given in the numerical example
at the end of Section 3. This paints a vivid picture of the
shifting emphasis given to the opinion of the various
respondents, depending on which Valuation Index is being
calculated, I(RBA) or I(RAB). The respondent who considers
the loss of 1 life in scenario A as bad as losing 10 lives in
scenario B will be accorded great inﬂuence when I(RBA) is
being calculated, but only a small degree of inﬂuence when
I(RAB) is being evaluated. Conversely, the respondent who
believes that losing 40 lives in scenario A is equivalent to
losing 10 lives in scenario B will ﬁnd his opinion given very
little weight when I(RBA) is being worked out, but his view
will be accorded the maximum inﬂuence in the calculation
of I(RAB).
Because each must lie below the sample mean, both
statistics, I(RBA) and I(RAB), will give emphasis to lower
opinions. The fact that a low value of RBAk will correspond
to a high value of RABk means that the importance of a view
will be upgraded in one scenario and while being down-
graded at the same time in the other when there is even
the smallest divergence of opinion in the sample.
Thus the reciprocality of the Valuation Index comes at
the price of giving different weightings to
(i) the view of the same individual depending on
whether the Valuation Index is applied to the valua-
tion ratios to give I(RBA) or to the reciprocals of the
valuation ratios to give IðR1BA Þ ¼ IðRABÞ, and
(ii) the views of different individuals, unless (a) all the
individuals regard scenario B as no more fearsome
than scenario A when the Valuation Index, I(RBA) is
Table 4
Sample mean, Valuation Index, Second Valuation Index for the example of
Section 5 in steady state.
rBA 1.407 rAB 1.203
I(RBA) 1.022 I(RAB) 0.978
K(RBA) 1.129 K(RAB) 0.886
164 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173being sought, or else (b) all the individuals regard
scenario A as no more fearsome than scenario B
when the Valuation Index, IðR1BA Þ ¼ IðRABÞ is being
sought.
The only exception to (i) and (ii) is the degenerate case
where all respondents respond identically.
Another perspective is given by considering the sensi-
tivity functions associated with the formation of the Valu-
ation Index. As noted in Section 5, and shown in Fig. 5, the
change in sensitivities to the view of the same person
between the formation of I(RBA) and the formation of
I(RAB) can be enormous.
In this context, it is pertinent that the sensitivity to the
view of the kth person of the back-transformed mean,
Z(RBA), of a power transformation is given by
@ZðRBAÞ
@RBAk
¼ RBAk
ZðRBAÞ
 b1 1
n
ð41Þ
where the back-transformed mean of the power transfor-
mation of power, b, is deﬁned by:
ZðRBAÞ ¼ 1n
Xn
k¼1
RbBAk
 !1
b
ð42Þ
Meanwhile, for the analogously formulated, back-trans-
formed mean of the reciprocal valuation ratios, the sensi-
tivity to the view of the kth person is:
@ZðRABÞ
@RABk
¼ RABk
ZðRABÞ
 b1 1
n
ð43Þ
The two sensitivities should be the same if the view of
person k is to be treated consistently in the calculations
of both the mean of the valuation ratios, Z(RBA), and the
mean of the reciprocal valuation ratios, Z(RAB). Discounting
the degenerate case where all people in the sample specify
exactly the same valuation ratio, the equality of Eqs. (41)
and (43) necessitates b = 1, rendering the back-trans-
formed mean equal to the arithmetic or sample mean.
For the non-degenerate cases where not all the opinions
are identical, the back-transformed means, Z(RBA), of the
valuation ratios, RBAk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n may be classiﬁed by
their relationship to the back-transformed means, Z(RAB),
of the reciprocals of the valuation ratios, RABk,
k = 1, 2, . . . , n, according to:
ZðRBAÞ
> 1ZðRABÞ b > 0
¼ 1ZðRABÞ b ¼ 0
< 1ZðRABÞ b < 0
8><
>>: ð44Þ
The geometric mean Z(RBA)jb=0 (see, e.g. [26]), possesses
the property of reciprocality, but, like the Valuation Index,
does so only at the cost of an inconsistent treatment of the
same individual on either side of the equals sign in the cen-
tral equation of inequality (44). Thus the arguments made
in Thomas [26] are reinforced for the invalidity of any
back-transformed mean of a power transformation, includ-
ing the geometric mean, apart from a linear transforma-
tion. By contrast, the structurally independent arithmetic
or sample mean emerges enhanced from the analysis andin this context as the only measure derived from a power
transformation that treats individuals and their opinions
consistently when calculating the back-transformed
means of both the valuation ratios and the reciprocal valu-
ation ratios.
7. The Second Valuation Index
Reciprocality is not unique to the Valuation Index. For
example, there is no reason to suppose that it is not equally
valid for respondent, k, to use Convention 2 to set his per-
sonal VPF. If it is assumed that all respondents will use this
valuation convention, and, furthermore a ratio of means is
taken, then it can be shown that the result will be the Sec-
ond Valuation Index, K(RBA), given by:
KðRBAÞ ¼
Xn
k¼1
hkRBAk ð45Þ
where
hk ¼
max 1;R1BAk
 
Pn
m¼1 max 1;R
1
BAm
  ð46Þ
(c.f. Eqs. (23) and (24)). This Second Valuation Index will
share with the Valuation Index the property of
reciprocality:
K
1
RBA
 
¼ KðRABÞ ¼ 1KðRBAÞ ð47Þ
where
K R1BA
 
¼
Xn
k¼1
ak
1
RBAk
ð48Þ
Table 4 compares results for the sample mean, the Val-
uation Index and the Second Valuation Index for the
numerical example of Section 5, demonstrating the recip-
rocality of both the Valuation Index and the Second Valua-
tion Index.
The weightings in Eq. (48) are different from those
given in Eq. (46):
ak ¼ maxð1;RBAkÞPn
m¼1 maxð1;RBAmÞ
– hk ð49Þ
Meanwhile, the sensitivity functions for the Second Val-
uation Index may be shown to be:
@K
@RBAk
¼ 1Pn
m¼1 max 1;R
1
BAm
  RBAk > 1 ð50Þ
and
@K
@RBAk
¼
Pn
m¼1RBAm max 1;R
1
BAm
 
R2BAk
Pn
m¼1 max 1;R
1
BAm
  2 RBAk 6 1 ð51Þ
P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173 165indicating that the Second Valuation Index is structurally
view dependent.
It should be emphasised that the Second Valuation
Index, K(RBA), is no more to be recommended than the Val-
uation Index, I(RBA), since neither is structurally view inde-
pendent. Both exhibit signiﬁcantly different sensitivities to
views in the sample. Similarly, the view of the same indi-
vidual is given a different weighting depending on whether
the Second Valuation Index is applied to the valuation
ratios to give K(RBA) or to the reciprocals of the valuation
ratios to give K R1BA
 
¼ KðRABÞ.
Accepting that both statistics are of questionable valid-
ity, there would appear to be no particular reason for pre-
ferring the Valuation Index to the Second Valuation Index.
So if the Valuation Index were valid, then the Second
Valuation Index should be equally valid. However, it is
clear from Table 4 that the Valuation Index and the Second
Valuation Index produce different results, implying a
logical contradiction. Hence neither the Valuation Index
nor the Second Valuation Index is valid.8. Discussion
The inconsistencies and contradictions revealed above
result from an attempt to ﬁnd a consolidating ﬁgure with
the property of reciprocality. This attempt comes up
against Jensen’s proof over a hundred years ago that the
mean of the reciprocal will be greater than the reciprocal
of the mean, not equal to it [18]. This ﬁnding will apply
not only to the sample mean, where an equal weight is
given to each view, but also to the Valuation Index,
I(RBA), where the weightings, pk;
P
kpk ¼ 1, are given to
the various views. Thus the equation
I
1
RBA
 
¼ IðRABÞ ¼
Xn
k¼1
qkRABk ¼
1
IðRBAÞ ¼
1Pn
k¼1pkRBAk
ð52Þ
can work only through applying markedly different weigh-
tings, pk, qk, simultaneously to the same person’s view, as
demonstrated in Fig. 6. This result will apply even if no-one
in the sample has a valuation ratio greater than unity, so
that IðRBAÞ ¼ RBA, with the exception of the degenerate case
where everyone’s view is exactly the same. Such gross
inconsistency in the treatment of the same person’s view
at the same time is the price paid for reciprocality in the
Valuation Index.
The Valuation Index is not unique in possessing the
property of reciprocality. The same behaviour is exhibited
by the Second Valuation Index, K(RBA), which stems from
the individual measuring his higher VPF relative to his
lower VPF rather than the other way round (Convention
2 rather than Convention 1 in Section 2). In this case, too,
different weightings, hk and ak, are needed to consolidate
the views of the individuals into K(RBA) and K(1/RBA) so as
to achieve reciprocality.
It needs to be recognised that, while an individual’s
view will exhibit reciprocality, the non-monolithic nature
of a democratic society, where different people are
allowed to have different views, means that society’s view
will not and, indeed, should not possess the sameproperty. Reciprocality at a societal level would imply
that everyone held exactly the same opinion, a rather dis-
turbing notion akin to Arrow’s dictator, normally pre-
cluded by assumption [1,2].
In addition to the inconsistencies just discussed, both
the Valuation Index and the Second Valuation Index dem-
onstrate structural view dependence. Discrimination
against some of the views in the survey is built into the
way in which these indices work. This result is of funda-
mental importance. It means that these indices have no
place in the interpretation of opinion surveys.
For example, the Valuation Index incorporates system-
atic bias against the view of anyone who fears the hazard
under investigation more than the base hazard. Thus if
the research question is whether people fear death in
multiple fatality accidents more than in the base case of
a single fatality accident, the Valuation Index will down-
grade the views of those with a greater fear of death in
multi-fatality accidents; the greater a person’s fear of
death in a multiple fatality accident, the more his view will
be downgraded.
Use of the Valuation Index when anyone fears the
hazard under investigation more that the base hazard will
result in a recommendation to spend less money on pro-
tection against the hazard in question than would be rec-
ommended using the unbiased sample mean. Thus in the
focus group introduced in Section 5, suppose that four peo-
ple converge on valuation ratios of 2.8, the ﬁgure applied in
the UK railway industry for multiple fatality accidents
from 1988 to 2003, while the remaining three respondents
maintain a neutral valuation ratio of 1.0. The recommenda-
tion coming from the unbiased sample mean is for a 103%
increase in the spend to protect against the multi-fatality
as opposed to the single fatality accident. By contrast, the
low-biased Valuation Index will call for a much lower
up-rating: just 58%.9. Conclusions
The consolidation of respondents’ valuations of a non-
market good, the readings, into a single ﬁgure constitutes
a signiﬁcant task in soft measurement. It has been shown
elsewhere that when the consolidation method applied
to the different views in the sample can be represented
as a sequential process of transformation, averaging and
back-transformation, of all the possible increasing and dif-
ferentiable transformations, only linear functions preserve
the necessary impartiality. This implies that the sample
mean is an unbiased statistic, impartial in its treatment
of the views of all respondents. But no statistic that relies
on a nonlinear, increasing and differentiable transforma-
tion for its formation (the geometric mean, for example)
can share this impartiality. With their minimum and max-
imum seeking functions, the Valuation Index and the Sec-
ond Valuation Index are complicated measures that do not
ﬁt neatly into the sequential process just alluded to. Hence
it has been necessary to perform the investigations
detailed in this paper to ﬁnd whether or not they conform
to the requirements of structural view independence, and,
of course, they do not. Both the Valuation Index and the
166 P.J. Thomas /Measurement 60 (2015) 155–173Second Valuation Index fail the test of structural view
independence, meaning that each one has an inherent bias
against certain views and in favour of others built into its
structure. This bias means that neither should be used in
the soft measurement exercise of investigating human
views by opinion survey.
The Second Valuation Index is constructed using the
same arguments employed to construct the Valuation
Index, except that Convention 2 is used rather than Con-
vention 1 – the individual takes as his reference point
the amount he would sanction to avert death under the
scenario he fears less, rather in the way that the UK rail
industry used to have a baseline VPF, which used to be
up rated by a factor of 2.8 to give a special VPF for multi-
fatality accidents. Since Convention 2 and Convention 1
are equally valid, it follows that if the Valuation Index is
valid, then so should be the Second Valuation Index. But
the latter gives a different answer, implying that the valid-
ity of the Valuation Index implies its own invalidity. This
constitutes a logical contradiction, the resolution of which
requires that neither the Valuation Index nor the Second
Valuation Index can be regarded as valid.
It has been shown that the Valuation Index’s reciprocal-
ity, a property shared by the Second Valuation Index and
regarded by Valuation Index proponents as an advantage,
is achieved only at the price of an inconsistent treatment
of the same person’s view whenever there is any difference
of opinion in the sample. Jensen’s Inequality explains how
this inconsistency is an inevitable result of the reciprocal-
ity displayed by both these indices.
The Valuation Index will be equal to the sample
mean in only two cases, in both of which the spread
of opinion in the sample is strongly restricted: either
no respondent values the option under investigation
higher than the base option or else exactly the same val-
uation ratio is shared by all respondents. In all other
cases the Valuation Index will return a value less than
the sample mean. The bias towards low valuations
implies that the Valuation Index is particularly unsuit-
able for investigating whether or not society wants more
to be spent to prevent deaths in a multiple fatality rail
accident. Safety cases or regulations making use of the
results of a study using the Valuation Index must be
regarded as unsafe to the extent that they rely on such
a study for support.
As a general point, the requirement for impartiality is so
fundamental and the fact that no consolidation statistic
apart from the sample mean has so far been found to be
structurally view independent suggests that before a new
consolidation statistic is used, it needs ﬁrst to be demon-
strated that it passes the test of structural view
independence.
The ﬁnding has particular importance for the UK
because opinion surveys interpreted using the Valuation
Index have been inﬂuential in the changes to safety policy
brought in for UK rail transport, where the amount recom-
mended by the UK Rail Safety and Standards Board since
2003 to avert each death in a multiple fatality accident
has been reduced to about a third of what it used to be
before that date.Appendix A. The relative size of the Valuation Index,
I(RBA) and the mean of the valuation ratio, RBA
It will be proved in this appendix that the Valuation
Index is less than the sample mean in all except for two sit-
uations, when it will equal the sample mean.
We note ﬁrst that the weighting factors, pk, introduced
in Eq. (23) satisfy the Kolmogorov conditions for a proba-
bility distribution, since pkP 0 for all k, while summing
all pk over k gives unity:
Xn
k¼1
pk ¼
Xn
k¼1
min 1;R1BAk
 
Pn
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
 
¼
Pn
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
 
Pn
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
  ¼ 1 ðA:1Þ
This fact makes it convenient to regard the views of the
people in the sample as the population with which we will
be concerned. The Valuation Index, I(RBA), may now be seen
to be the expectation of the valuation ratio, RBA, for the
sample population when it is assumed that the valuation
ratio, RBAk, of the kth person in the sample is chosen with
probability, pk:
IðRBAÞ ¼ E
pk
sðRBAÞ ¼
Xn
k¼1
pkRBAk ðA:2Þ
Here the expectation operator, E, has been labelled with
the discrete probability distribution across the sample,
pk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and given the superscript, s, to signify
that the population of interest is the sample population
of n people.
Now let us assume that n1 of the respondents set their
valuation ratio less than or equal to 1.0, while n2 set their
valuation ratio greater than 1.0, so that:
n1 þ n2 ¼ n ðA:3Þ
Let us separate the sample of valuation ratios into
two classes: less than or equal to unity on the one hand
and greater than unity on the other. Ordering the
respondents, k, so that RBAk 6 1 k = 1, 2, . . . , n1, while
RBAk > 1 for k = n1 + 1, n1 + 2, . . . , n, we may now rewrite
Eq. (A.2) as:
IðRBAÞ ¼
Pn1
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
 
RBAk þ
Pn
k¼n1þ1 min 1;R
1
BAk
 
RBAkPn1
k¼1 min 1;R
1
BAk
 
þPnk¼n1þ1 min 1;R1BAk
 
¼
Pn1
k¼1RBAk þ n2
n1 þ
Pn
k¼n1þ1R
1
BAk
ðA:4Þ
Eq. (A.4) may be re-expressed as
IðRBAÞ ¼
n1 1n1
Pn1
k¼1RBAk þ n2
n1 þ n2 1n2
Pn
k¼n1þ1R
1
BAk
¼
n1 E
low
sðRBAÞ þ n2
n1 þ n2 E
high
s R1BA
  ðA:5Þ
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IðRBAÞ ¼
n1
n2
E
low
sðRBAÞ þ 1
n1
n2
þ E
high
s R1BA
  ðA:6Þ
where E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1=n1
Pn1
k¼1RBAk
 
is the expectation of the
valuation ratio over the n1 respondents in the sample
whose valuation ratios were low, viz. less than or equal
to 1.0, when each such person is chosen at random. We
may note that E
low
sðRBAÞ is identical with the sub-sample
average: RBAlow ¼ E
low
sðRBAÞ. In a similar fashion,
E
high
s R1BA
 
¼ 1=n2
Pn
k¼n1þ1R
1
BA
 
is the expectation of the
reciprocal of the valuation ratio over the n2 respondents
in the sample whose valuation ratios were high, viz. more
than 1.0, when each such person is chosen at random. Once
again this expectation value is identical with the subsam-
ple average: R1BA high ¼ E
high
s R1BA
 
.
Eq. (A.6) may be compared with the expected valuation
ratio for the sample, under the assumption that each per-
son’s opinion is as likely as any other to be chosen. This
may be written:
EsðRBAÞ ¼ 1n
Xn
k¼1
RBAk ¼
Pn1
k¼1RBAk þ
Pn2
k¼n1þ1RBAk
n1 þ n2
¼
n1 E
low
sðRBAÞ þ n2 E
high
sðRBAÞ
n1 þ n2
¼
n1
n2
E
low
sðRBAÞ þ E
high
sðRBAÞ
n1
n2
þ 1 ðA:7Þ
where E
high
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1=n2ð
Pn
k¼n1þ1RBAkÞ . As before, this expec-
tation value may be observed to be equal to the sub-sam-
ple mean: RBAhigh ¼ E
high
sðRBAÞ. Moreover, the expectation
value across the whole sample is identical with the mean
of the whole sample: RBA ¼ EsðRBAÞ.
We need to consider 3 cases, as follows:
Case 1: n2 = 0
In this case, no-one in the sample sets his valu-
ation ratio greater than unity, so that RBAk 6 1
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Now n1 = n and n2 = 0, and
everyone is in the ‘‘low’’ category. Hence
E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ EsðRBAÞ and from Eq. (A.5):
IðRBAÞ ¼ E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ EsðRBAÞ ðA:8Þwhere Es(RBA) is the expectation over all n respondents,
equal to the whole-sample average.
Case 2: n1 = 0
In this case no respondent sets his valuation
ratio at unity or below, so that n1 = 0 and
n2 = n, so that everyone is in the ‘‘high’’ category.
Thus, from Eq. (A.5):IðRBAÞ ¼ 1
E
high
s R1BA
  ¼ 1
Es R1BA
  ðA:9ÞBut Jensen’s inequality [18,9] implies thatEðR1BA Þ >
1
EðRBAÞ ðA:10ÞHenceIðRBAÞ < EsðRBAÞ ðA:11Þ
Thus, when everyone sets his valuation ratio above 1.0, the
Valuation Index will always be less than the whole sample
average.
Case 3: n1 > 0 and n2 > 0
In this case one or more respondents sets his
valuation ratio, RBAk, at or below one while
others set their valuation ratios above one.
Subtracting Eq. (A.6) from Eq. (A.7) gives the dif-
ference, DEI, between the whole sample average
of the valuation ratio, equal to the expected val-
uation ratio given by Eq. (A.7), and the Valuation
Index:DEI ¼ D E
low
þD E
high
ðA:12Þwhere D E
low
is deﬁned as
D E
low
¼ n1
n2
E
low
sðRBAÞ 1n1
n2
þ 1
1
n1
n2
þ E
high
s R1BA
 
0
B@
1
CA ðA:13Þ
and D E
high
as
D E
high
¼
E
high
sðRBAÞ
n1
n2
þ 1 
1
n1
n2
þ E
high
s R1BA
  ðA:14Þ
In the case under consideration, Case 3, where n2 > 0,
E
high
s R1BA
 
will exist and be equal to the arithmetic average
of the reciprocals of the valuation ratios where the valua-
tion ratio is greater than unity: R1BAkjðRBAk > 1Þ. Hence:
E
high
s R1BA
 
< 1 ðA:15Þ
Substituting condition (A.15) into Eq. (A.13) shows that
D E
low
< 0. Inspection of Eq. (A.13) shows that, for possible
variations in E
low
sðRBAÞ, the most negative value of D E
low
,
which we shall label minðD E
low
Þ, will occur at the limiting
value, E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1. Substituting this value of E
low
sðRBAÞ into
Eq. (A.13) gives
min D E
low
 
¼ min
Es
low
ðRBAÞ
D E
low
¼ n1
n2
1
n1
n2
þ 1
1
n1
n2
þ E
high
s R1BA
 
0
B@
1
CA ðA:16Þ
The subscript, 1.0, is introduced now to signify the dif-
ference between the expected value and the Valuation
Index at the point where E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1, so that
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Fig. 7. The difference between the expected value, E(RBA) and the
calculated Valuation Index, Ic(RBA). A positive difference implies that
I(RBA) < E(RBA).
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 
þ D E
high
ðA:17Þ
The subscript, f, will be used to signify the difference
when E
low
sðRBAÞ takes a fractional value below unity:
0 6 E
low
sðRBAÞ < 1. If the other deﬁning parameters in equa-
tions (A.13) and (A.14), namely E
high
sðRBAÞ, E
high
sðR1BA Þ and n1/
n2, are kept constant then Eq. (A.16) implies that
DEIf > DEI1:0 ðA:18Þ
To proceed further it is necessary to specify a probabil-
ity distribution for the valuation ratios above 1.0, with the
condition that the distribution must have a sharp cut-off at
the lower end of the range, that is to say immediately
above unity. The simplest probability distribution satisfy-
ing this requirement is the uniform distribution on the
interval ð1þ;2 E
high
ðRBAÞ  1þÞ, where 1+ is a number inﬁni-
tesimally greater than 1.0. Under this, arguably the most
general random distribution, the expectation of the reci-
procal of RBA may be written in terms of the expectation
of RBA, thus eliminating one independent variable (see
Appendix C, Eq. (C.18), with K set to unity):
E
high
s R1BA
 
 1
E
high
sðRBAÞ 1þ
1
3
2 E
high
sðRBAÞ 2
2 E
high
sðRBAÞ
0
@
1
A
2
0
B@
1
CA
¼ 1
3 E
high
sðRBAÞ
 3 4 EhighsðRBAÞ
 2
 2 E
high
sðRBAÞ þ1
 !
ðA:19Þ
Although diminishing in size, all successive correction
terms are nevertheless positive, as demonstrated in
Appendix C. Therefore the calculated value, as given by
Eq. (A.19) will be less than the true value:
E
high
sðR1BA Þ

c
< E
high
s R1BA
 
ðA:20Þ
Thus the magnitude of the negative terms in the two
components of DEI, as given by equations (A.13) and
(A.14), will be greater when Eq. (A.19) is used as an
approximation for E
high
s R1BA
 
. Hence the true difference,
DEI, will be slightly greater than the calculated difference,
DEIc:
DEI > DEIc ðA:21Þ
This situation will apply for all values of E
low
sðRBAÞ,
including when E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1, so that
DEI1:0 > DEIc1:0 ðA:22Þ
Combining condition (A.22) with that of (A.18) means
that
DEIf > DEIc1:0 ðA:23Þ
Thus DEI will be greater than DEIc1:0 for all possible val-
ues of E
low
sðRBAÞ: 0 < E
low
sðRBAÞ 6 1. Hence we may combinethe two conditions (A.22) and (A.23) into the simpler, gen-
eral condition:
DEI > DEIc1:0 ðA:24Þ
Thus if the calculated difference, DEIc1:0 , at Elow
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1,
is greater than zero, then it will be known that
DEI > 0 ðA:25Þ
for the same values of the parameters, n1/n2 and E
high
sðRBAÞ.
Condition (A.24) may be tested by using Eq. (A.19) in the
evaluation of equations (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14), at
E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1 and over a suitable range of n1/n2 and E
high
sðRBAÞ.
The results of this test are given in Fig. 7, which shows
the calculated difference over the following ranges in n1/n2
and E
high
sðRBAÞ:
0 6 n1
n2
6 10
1 < Es
high
ðRBAÞ 6 10
ðA:26Þ
The difference is always positive, apart from the limit-
ing conditions where Case 3 degenerates into Case 1.
Fig. 8 shows DEI0:2 ;DEI1:0 and DEIc1:0 against n1/n2 at two
values of Es
high
ðRBAÞ: Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 6 and Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 10. The
‘‘exact’’ differences, DEI0:2 ;DEI1:0 , were found using the ﬁrst
thousand terms (K = 1000) in the convergent approxima-
tion of equation (C.15), as opposed to a single term
(K = 1) for the ’’calculated difference’’. It is clear from
Fig. 8 that DEI0:2 > DEI1:0 > DEIc1:0 for both values of E
s
high
ðRBAÞ,
Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 6 and Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 10.
Fig. 7 shows that the difference, DEIc, and hence DEI, is
increasing in the expected valuation ratio, E
high
sðRBAÞ,
amongst those who fear Scenario B more, irrespective of
the ratio, n1/n2. The difference, DEIc, approaches zero for
the limiting condition, E
high
sðRBAÞ ! 1. Given that none of
the n2 respondents can have set their valuation ratio at less
01
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6
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Fig. 8. The difference between the sample mean and the Valuation Index
plotted against n1/n2. ‘Exact’ differences at E
s
low
ðRBAÞ ¼ 0:2 and 1.0 found
using a 1000-term approximation to Es
high
R1BA
 
. ‘Calculated’ difference at
Es
low
ðRBAÞ ¼ 1:0 found from a 1-term approximation. Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 10 for the
top group in the ﬁgure; Es
high
ðRBAÞ ¼ 6 for the lower group.
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must have set their valuation ratios at 1+. This limiting con-
dition is consistent with Case 1, where all n = n1 + n2
respondents set their valuation at or less than unity, when
the Valuation Index and the expected valuation ratio are
the same, implying the difference of zero observed.
Meanwhile, a high value of n1/n2 implies that the large
majority of the respondents belong to the group of n1 who
set their valuation ratio less than or equal to unity. The ﬁg-
ure suggests that DEIc? 0 as n1/n2?1, implying a
smooth transition to the ﬁnding for Case 1, when n2 = 0,
where the Valuation Index has been shown to be equal
to the expected value of the valuation ratio.
In the other limiting case where n1/n2 = 0, everyone will
be in the ‘‘high’’ category, corresponding to Case 2. Here,
from equations (A.7) and (A.9) and condition (A.10):
DEI ¼ E
high
sðRBAÞ  1
E
high
s R1BA
  > 0 ðA:27Þ
The graph shows that there is a strongly rising trend of
DEIc with E
high
sðRBAÞ at low values of n1/n2. The maximum
that occurs just above n1/n2 = 0 has been shown to be
slightly less than the true maximum (Fig. 8), and the fall-
off towards n1/n2 = 0 is rather greater than is observed with
the 1000-term calculation. The equation of the line of DEIc
with E
high
sðRBAÞ is derived in Appendix D, and shown to be
asymptotically linear in E
high
sðRBAÞ, and set to continue
indeﬁnitely.
Fig. 7 shows also that the difference between the calcu-
lated Valuation Index (and hence the Valuation Index) and
the expected valuation ratio can be large – a signiﬁcant
fraction of the Valuation Index. The difference is large when
there are many, n2, respondents who set their valuation
ratio greater than unity (so that n1/n2 will be low) and they
set their valuation ratios high (so that E
high
sðRBAÞ is high).Under the mild restriction of a uniform distribution
being assumed for the valuation ratios of the n2 respon-
dents fearing scenario B more than scenario A, it has been
proved that the Valuation Index will always underestimate
the expected valuation ratio where some respondents fear
scenario B more than scenario A, viz. n2 > 0, for the ranges
for n1/n2 and E
high
sðRBAÞ set out in condition (A.26). Put the
other way round, if the valuation ratios of the n2 corre-
spondents fearing Scenario B more than Scenario A are uni-
formly distributed, a priori an entirely reasonable
proposition, then the Valuation Index will always be less
than the expected valuation ratio.
The difference between the expected valuation ratio
and the Valuation Index has been observed to behave in
a smooth and predictable manner when n2 > 0. It is pre-
sumed, therefore, that the same result will hold if the
upper limits for n1/n2 and E
high
sðRBAÞ are increased without
limit. The result has, in fact, been conﬁrmed for the
extended ranges, 0 6 n1n2 6 25 and 1 < E
s
high
ðRBAÞ 6 100, which
is likely to be sufﬁcient for all practical purposes.
Considering all 3 Cases, the Valuation Index will be less
than the sample mean in all except two situations, when it
will equal the sample mean. Those situations are:
(i) the degenerate case of no variation between views,
and
(ii) the case when no respondent fears scenario B more
than scenario A.
Appendix B. The sensitivity function for the Valuation
Index, I(RBA)
We will show in this appendix how expressions for the
sensitivity functions of the Valuation Index can be derived.
From Eq. (23):
I ¼ p1RBA1 þ p2RBA2 þ . . . þ piRBAi þ . . . þ pkRBAk
þ . . . þ pnRBAn ðB:1Þ
so that differentiating with respect to RBAi yields
@I
@RBAi
¼ RBA1 @p1
@RBAi
þ RBA2 @p2
@RBAi
þ    þ pi þ RBAi @pi
@RBAi
þ . . . þ RBAk @pk
@RBAi
. . . þ RBAn @pn
@RBAi
¼ pi þ
Xn
m¼1
m–i
RBAm
@pm
@RBAi
þ RBAi @pi
@RBAi
ðB:2Þ
Differentiating Eq. (24) for i– k:
@pk
@RBAi
¼min 1;R1BAk
  @
@RBAi
1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
 
¼min 1;R1BAk
 
 1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  2
 @
@RBAi
min 1;R1BAi
 
ðB:3Þ
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 
¼ 1, and so
@pk
@RBAi
¼ 0 i– k; RBAi 6 1 ðB:4Þ
But if RBAi > 1;minð1;R1BAiÞ ¼ 1=RBAi, and so @minð1;R1BAiÞ=
@RBAi ¼ 1=R2BAi. Hence
@pk
@RBAi
¼ 1
R2BAi
min 1;R1BAk
 
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  2 i – k; RBAi > 1
ðB:5Þ
Meanwhile for i = k
@pi
@RBAi
¼min 1;R1BAi
  @
@RBAi
1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
 
þ 1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  @
@RBAi
min 1;R1BAi
 
ðB:6Þ
When RBAi 6 1, equation (B.6) reduces to (cf. equations
(B.4) and (B.5)):
@pi
@RBAi
¼ 0 RBAi 6 1 ðB:7Þ
When RBAi > 1;min 1;R
1
BAi
 
¼ 1=RBAi, Eq. (B.6) becomes
@pi
@RBAi
¼ 1
R3BAi
1Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  2 1R2BAi
1Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
¼ 1
R2BAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1minð1;R1BAmÞ
1
 !
RBAi>1
ðB:8Þ
Thus when RBAi 6 1
@I
@RBAi
¼ pi RBAi 6 1 ðB:9Þ
We may substitute the result that min 1;R1BAi
 
¼ 1 when
RBAi 6 1 into Eq. (24) to give:
@I
@RBAi
¼ 1Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  RBAi 6 1 ðB:10Þ
Meanwhile, when RBAi > 1, then
@I
@RBAi
¼piþ 1
R2BAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  2 X
n
m¼ 1
m–i
min 1;R1BAm
 
RBAm
þ 1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1minð1;R1BAmÞ
1
 !
ðB:11Þ
or
@I
@RBAi
¼
min 1;R1BAi
 
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
þ 1
R2BAi
Pn
m¼1minð1;R1BAmÞ
 2X
n
m¼1
m–i
min 1;R1BAm
 
RBAm
þ 1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  1RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
0
@
1
A
ðB:12ÞHence
@I
@RBAi
¼ 1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
 1þ
Pn
m¼1
m–i
RBAmmin 1;R
1
BAm
 
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 þ1RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
0
@
1
A
¼ 1
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
  1þ
Pn
m¼1
m–i
RBAmmin 1;R
1
BAm
 
RBAi
Pn
m¼1min 1;R
1
BAm
 
0
@
1
A RBAi >1
ðB:13Þ
Hence
@I
@RBAi
¼
1þPnm¼1RBAm min 1;R1BAm  RBAi min 1;R1BAi 
R2BAi
Pn
m¼1 min 1;R
1
BAm
  2
RBAi > 1 ðB:14Þ
and, ﬁnally
@I
@RBAi
¼
Pn
m¼1RBAm min 1;R
1
BAm
 
R2BAi
Pn
m¼1 minð1;R1BAmÞ
 2 RBAi > 1 ðB:15ÞAppendix C. The expected value of the reciprocal of a
random variable
In this appendix we derive an approximation for the
expected value of the reciprocal of a random variable.
Let h(X) be a continuous, non-linear function of a ran-
dom variable, X, that has mean, l. We may expand about
the mean using a Taylor series:
hðXÞ ¼ hðlÞ þ ðX  lÞdh
dX

X¼l
þ 1
2!
ðX  lÞ2d
2h
dX2

X¼l
þ 1
3!
ðX  lÞ3d
3h
dX3

X¼l
þ 1
4!
ðX  lÞ4d
4h
dX4

X¼l
þ 1
5!
ðX  lÞ5d
5h
dX5

X¼l
þ 1
6!
ðX  lÞ6d
6h
dX6

X¼l
þ . . . : ðC:1Þ
The expected value, E(h(X)) is given by:
EðhðXÞÞ¼hðlÞþdh
dX

X¼l
ðEðXÞlÞþ 1
2!
d2h
dX2

X¼l
EððXlÞ2Þ
þ 1
3!
d3h
dX3

X¼l
EððXlÞ3Þþ 1
4!
d4h
dX4

X¼l
EððXlÞ4Þ
þ 1
5!
d5h
dX5

X¼l
EððXlÞ5Þþ 1
6!
d6h
dX6

X¼l
EððXlÞ6Þþ . . . :
ðC:2Þ
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and so:
EðhðXÞÞ ¼ hðlÞ þ 1
2!
d2h
dX2

X¼l
l2 þ
1
3!
d3h
dX3

X¼l
l3
þ 1
4!
d4h
dX4

X¼l
l4 þ
1
5!
d5h
dX5

X¼l
l5
þ 1
6!
d6h
dX6

X¼l
l6 þ . . . þ
1
r!
drh
dXr

X¼l
lr þ . . .
¼ hðlÞ þ
X1
r¼2
1
r!
drh
dXr

X¼l
lr ðC:3Þ
where lr is the rth moment taken about the mean, viz. the
rth central moment:
lr ¼ EððX  lÞrÞ ðC:4Þ
(so that, for example, l1 = 0, as observed already, and
l2 = var(X)).
Let us now specify the function, h(X), as the reciprocal of
X:
hðXÞ ¼ 1
X
ðC:5Þ
Successive differentiation yields:
dh
dX
¼ X2
d2h
dX2
¼ 2X3
d3h
dX3
¼ 3 2 X4
d4h
dX4
¼ 4 3 2 X5
..
.
drh
dXr
¼ ð1Þrr! 1
Xrþ1
ðC:6Þ
Substituting from equations (C.5) and (C.6) into equa-
tion (C.3) gives:
E
1
X
 
¼ hðlÞ þ
X1
r¼2
1
r!
ð1Þrr! 1
Xrþ1

X¼l
lr
¼ 1
l
þ
X1
r¼2
ð1Þr lr
lrþ1
ðC:7Þ
Now let the variable, X, be uniformly distributed on
(a,b). The mean is then:
l ¼ aþ b
2
ðC:8Þ
while the central moments are given by [29]:
lr ¼
ða bÞr þ ðb aÞr
2rþ1ðr þ 1Þ ðC:9ÞWe may develop equation (C.9) as:
lr ¼
ða bÞða bÞr1 þ ðb aÞðb aÞr1
2rþ1ðr þ 1Þ ðC:10Þ
When r is odd, then (r  1) will be even, and so
ða bÞr1 ¼ ðb aÞr1 ðC:11Þ
which implies from equation (C.10) that all the odd central
moments will be zero:
lr ¼ 0 whenever r is odd ðC:12Þ
Hence we may rewrite equation (C.7) as:
E
1
X
 
¼ 1
l
þ
X1
n¼1
l2n
l2nþ1
ðC:13Þ
Using equations (C.8) and (C.9), the ratio, l2nl2nþ1, emerges
as:
l2n
l2nþ1
¼ ða bÞ
2n þ ðb aÞ2n
22nþ1ð2nþ 1Þ 
ðaþ bÞ2nþ1
22nþ1
¼ 2ðb aÞ
2n
ð2nþ 1Þðaþ bÞðaþ bÞ2n
¼ 1
2nþ 1
1
l
b a
aþ b
 2n
ðC:14Þ
Substituting from equation (C.14) into equation (C.13)
gives:
E
1
X
 
¼ 1
l
þ 1
l
X1
n¼1
1
2nþ 1
b a
aþ b
 2n
¼ 1
l
1þ
X1
n¼1
1
2nþ 1
b a
aþ b
 2n !
ðC:15Þ
It will be apparent that all the correction terms are posi-
tive. Moreover, since
1
2nþ 1 < 1 for all nP 1 ðC:16Þ
and
b a
aþ b < 1 ðC:17Þ
for all a < b – the requirement for a uniform distribution –
then the correction terms will be successively smaller.
Thus, for any ﬁnite K,
E
1
X
 
>
1
l 1þ
XK
n¼1
1
2nþ 1
b a
aþ b
 2n !
ðC:18Þ
The series on the right-hand side of inequality (C.18)
can be shown to be convergent for all ﬁnite b for a > 0. Suc-
cessive approximations corresponding to K = 1, 2, 3, . . . will
bring the calculation ever closer to the true solution for
E 1X
 
. The ﬁrst order approximation, taking K = 1, is used
in Appendix A.
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and the calculated Valuation Index, I(RBA), for Case 3
when n1/n2? 0
In this appendix we show that the difference between
the sample mean and the calculated Valuation Index tends
towards a linear function of the sample mean for the case
when most respondents have a high valuation ratio
(RBA > 1).
Substituting from Eq. (A.19) into Eq. (A.6) gives the
calculated value of the Valuation Index, Ic(RBA), as:
IcðRBAÞ ¼
3 E
high
sðRBAÞ
 3
n1
n2
E
low
sðRBAÞ þ 1
 
3 n1n2 Ehigh
sðRBAÞ
 3
þ 4 E
high
sðRBAÞ
 2
 2 E
high
sðRBAÞ þ 1
ðD:1Þ
where the term, ‘‘calculated value of the Valuation Index’’
is used to highlight the small degree of approximation
inherent in Eq. (A.19), which will return a slightly low
ﬁgure for E
high
sðR1BA Þ because of the omission of the higher-
order terms listed in equation (C.15). Setting
w ¼ E
low
sðRBAÞ
x ¼ n1
n2
y ¼ E
high
sðRBAÞ
ðD:2Þ
for compactness, we may subtract Eq. (D.1) from Eq. (A.7)
to give the calculated difference between the sample mean
and the calculated mean as:
DEIc ¼ xwþ yxþ 1 
3y3ðxwþ 1Þ
3xy3 þ 4y2  2yþ 1
¼ 3xðy
4  y3Þ þ y3  2y2 þ ywxð3y3  4y2 þ 2y 1Þ
ðxþ 1Þð3xy3 þ 4y2  2yþ 1Þ
ðD:3Þ
Imposing the condition, w ¼ E
low
sðRBAÞ ¼ 1, and also setting
x = n1/n2 = 0 as a limiting condition gives the equation of
the line at the extreme right-hand side of Fig. 7:
DEIc1:0 ¼
y3  2y2  y
4y2  2yþ 1 ¼
y
4

1 2y  1y2
1 12yþ 14y2
ðD:4Þ
so that DEIc1:0 ! y4 ¼
E
high
sðRBAÞ
4 as y?1 when x = n1/n2 = 0.
Appendix E. Model of the evolution of opinions in the
focus group
The Valuation Index, I, will evolve over time from its
initial value, I0 = 1, according to:
IðtÞ ¼ I0 þ
Z t
s¼0
bu ds ðE:1Þ
where b is the 1  7 row vector of the sensitivity functions,
@I/@RBAk:
b ¼ @I@RBA1 @I@RBA2 . . . @I@RBA7
h i
ðE:2Þwhile u is the column vector of the time differentials of the
views:
u ¼ drBA
dt
ðE:3Þ
where rBA ¼ rBA1 rBA2 . . . rBA7½ T is the 7  1 column
vector of views.
Meanwhile, the components of u are given by
uk ¼ drBAkdt ¼
rBAkf  rBAk
T
ðE:4Þ
where T is the time constant, 80 min in this case.
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